The Danger of Division: a Historical and Statistical Evaluation of Partition in Iraq by Naidoff, Caitlin
Caitlin Naidoff is a 2008 graduate of the University of Chicago, where she concentrated 
in Public Policy Studies with a specialization in Civil and Human Rights.  She is cur-
rently working in the Office of Presidential Correspondence for the White House.
the DanGer of Division:
a historiCal anD statistiCal evaluation of 
Partition in iraQ
Caitlin Naidoff
When sectarian violence was increasing in Iraq, many feared that the country would, upon American depar-ture, erupt into genocidal civil war.  The leading course 
of action being considered by the United States Congress, along 
with several military officials, was the institution of a partition that 
would divide the country into three ethnic regions, dominated by 
Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. 
On September 26, 2007 the United States Senate voted 75-
23 in favor of an amendment to the defense spending bill for 2008, 
authorizing the U.S. government to “encourage” a “federal” solu-
tion for Iraq (S. AMDT. 2011). The language of the amendment 
suggests the implementation of “soft partition”—an adaptation of 
strict partition that has been discussed most extensively by theno 
Senator Joseph Biden, the amendment’s sponsor, and by Michael 
O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institute.  Proponents of soft parti-
tion argue that it is significantly different from partition as it has 
been traditionally understood—that is, a partition resulting in the 
creation of distinct nation states, such as in the case of India and 
Pakistan.
A policy of soft partition would not divide Iraq into three 
independently governed nations but would instead take a federal 
approach, separating political and financial powers into regional 
governments that would have control over local linguistic and so-
cial policies (Brancati 14). Another alleged distinction between 
traditional and soft partition is the fact that the creation of re-
gional units would not necessitate ethnic segregation.  According 
to O’Hanlon, “it would be best to define three new autonomous 
regions as much by geography as ethnicity,” considering the com-
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plexity of ethnic relationships (O’Hanlon 16).  A geographic di-
vision of Iraq would utilize natural boundaries that already exist 
such as the Tigris River.  Furthermore, soft partition would enable 
more flexible borders than a traditional partition.  People would 
be allowed to move from state to state more easily than if separate 
nations were created.
That said, while soft partition would not require ethnic segre-
gation, there is a general consensus among proponents of the policy 
that this would be a preferable outcome.  Both Biden and O’Hanlon 
have created proposals in which ethnic division is an objective.  Ad-
ditionally, Iraqis would be required to carry national identification 
cards that would indicate their ethnic and regional affiliation. 
Under certain circumstances, this outcome would be plau-
sible.  According to Donald Horowitz, certain preconditions make 
partition involving ethnic segregation more likely to successfully 
decrease violent interactions between ethnic groups.  He cites three 
primary factors that particularly impact the likelihood that parti-
tion would succeed: (1) the regions being created already experi-
ence a high degree of ethnic homogeneity; (2) there is a wholesale 
defection of forces formerly committed to a unified government, 
now willing to support partition; and (3) there is external foreign 
support for the movement (Horowitz 266). 
My research suggests that none of these conditions is current-
ly present in Iraq. In this paper, I will argue that the policy of parti-
tion is problematic generally because it necessitates a conception 
of ethnic groups as more cohesive than they are, and specifically 
because of the current conditions in Iraq. While a policy of soft 
partition may be different from that of strict partition in certain 
respects, it would still facilitate the imposition of ethnic separation, 
the policy’s most problematic component.
Furthermore, drawing on the research of Nicholas Sambanis, 
I will show that, from a historical-statistical perspective, partition 
has had an insignificant effect on preventing the recurrence of vio-
lence in post-ethnic civil war societies.  Considering the high costs 
of implementing a partition in Iraq—both in terms of the opera-
tion and its potential negative effects, this paper suggests that the 
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burden of proof is on the advocates of partition to prove its effec-
tiveness in the country. 
ChallenGinG statiC notions of ethniCity
Partition theory’s underlying assumption that ethnic groups 
can be decisively and legally separated evinces a misconception of 
ethnic identifications as monolithic and stagnant.  It frames eth-
nic conflict as a “clash of civilizations” based on ancient, primordial 
affiliations that cannot be overcome (Huntington). Many ethnic 
conflict theorists, however, indicate that the construction and re-
construction of group boundaries do not wholly occur prior to a 
conflict but can be codified in anticipation of a conflict.  As ethnic 
conflict progresses, the development of tensions can influence the 
“shape and firmness” of the boundaries of ethnicity (Horowitz 74). 
This would suggest that ethnic identifications are dynamic and that 
ethnicity is not predetermined but is rather socially and contextu-
ally defined and redefined. 
Additionally, while certain antagonisms may be directly re-
lated to clashes of identity, many external factors contribute to and 
alter the nature of ethnic conflicts. To successfully mitigate sectar-
ian violence, policy proposals must address the multidimension-
ality of ethnic relationships.  Due to its misconception of ethnic 
antagonism as a result of clashing, ancient or inherent identities, a 
partition policy would not adequately address material factors af-
fecting the Sunni-Shiite conflict.
For example, one issue to be considered is the way in which 
sectarian violence relates to disputes over the distribution of oil rev-
enue. In his book Resource Wars, Michael T. Klare contends that 
“conflict over valuable resources” is “often intermixed with ethnic, 
religious, and tribal antagonisms” and that it is the interaction of 
all of these factors that has resulted in the preponderance of third 
world conflict (Klare x).  While O’Hanlon considers oil policy in 
his proposal for partition, he does not adequately address the po-
tential risks of the partition plan regarding revenue distribution.  A 
second factor that is not addressed by the partition policy is that of 
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political movements, and the way in which political systems have 
contributed to or detracted from certain conflicts.  In the case of 
Iraq, the Baathist regime played a role in facilitating ethnic con-
flict.  
ethniC iDentity formation in iraQ
The fear of genocide in Iraq has sparked debate among theo-
rists who suggest that ethnic groups in Iraq must be kept apart from 
one another in order to prevent civil war and draw upon Hunting-
ton’s theoretical parameters articulated in Clash of Civilizations in 
asserting that the contention between these groups has been and 
will continue to be irreconcilable. Upon historical examination, 
however, it appears that the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites 
is not age-old. Ethnic division has not always plagued Iraq in the 
way that it does today; rather, it has been codified and fostered by 
various interest groups at various times for political and economic 
gain. First, division was encouraged by Turkish interference, then 
by British colonialism, again under the Baathist regime, and finally 
by U.S. intervention.
The policies instituted by the British further evidence this 
point and are especially pertinent to the discussion of current 
proposals. The British perceived Iraq as fundamentally divided 
among distinct urban and rural populations. Certain policies cre-
ated under the British contributed to the creation and codification 
of ethnic identities, which were “supplied by the dominant cultural 
stereotypes of the day”(Dodge xi).  For instance, under the colonial 
administration, the Sunni Arab minority was designated authorita-
tive control over a predominantly Shiite Arab population. As often 
seen in racially stratified societies such as colonial Iraq, differential 
employment that disproportionately privileges ethnic minorities 
served “to build up a fund of resentment among the subject peoples 
and pretensions among the agents of colonial rule”(Horowitz 159). 
In this way, the so-called ancient sectarian conflict in Iraq can be 
understood instead as “primordial affiliations [that were] histori-
cally constructed.” 
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When Britain relinquished direct colonial control of Iraq after 
World War I, British administrators devolved power to the Sunni 
leaders that they had been working with throughout the colonial 
period.  As a result “inclusion of and comity among the different 
ethnic and religious communities were discarded to achieve Iraq’s 
formal independence as quickly as possible” (Dodge 31).  Unfortu-
nately, such actions have likely contributed to the complexity of the 
conflict today.
Following the rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1962) 
marked by Pan-Arab nationalism among Sunnis and Shiites, the 
establishment of the Baathist regime in 1968 ushered in the return 
of sectarian violence to Iraq.  The Baathists sought to facilitate the 
disintegration of “premodern tribalism” by using “extreme levels of 
violence… to co-opt or break any independent vestiges of civil so-
ciety” (Dodge 159).  In response to Baathist strategies of margin-
alization, reactionary cultural, religious, and ethnic groups gained 
support—especially among those who had been disenfranchised 
by Saddam Hussein, such as the Shiites.  
The surge in sectarian violence that has occurred in recent 
years suggests that additional factors such as U.S. intervention 
could be contributing to the antagonism.  Even throughout the 
Baathist period, joint Sunni-Shiite prayer services were common-
place. In considering ethnic conflict prior to US intervention, many 
first person accounts of the period assert that “most Muslims de-
nied there was any real problem” (Rubin).  While proponents of 
partition might argue that such statements exaggerate the potential 
for unified national identity in Iraq, at the very least they serve to 
demonstrate that interactions between ethnic groups in the region 
are complex, dynamic, and not categorically independent.  It should 
be noted that this paper does not dispute the fact that there existed 
various distinctions between Sunnis and Shiites for hundreds of 
years. However, it does suggest that the violence of the sectarian 
conflict can, at least in part, be attributed to short-term political 
developments.
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what PoliCies are beinG ProPoseD in iraQ toDay?
It cannot be ignored, despite relative periods of low-level eth-
nic conflict in Iraqi history, that the post-war insurgency has been 
ethnically divided and that the Sunni- Shiite conflict has become 
increasingly violent. According to Anthony Cordesman in a Janu-
ary 2007 insurgency update conducted by the Center for Strategic 
International Studies, “sectarian and ethnic divisions have expand-
ed from the actions of extremists and activists to become popular 
movements with a steadily broader base” (Cordesman 10).  The 
number of ethno-sectarian incidents had been steadily increasing 
from the start of the Iraq War and spiked dramatically starting in 
January 2006.
As a result of the violence, the number of refugees and in-
ternally displaced peoples continued to grow. As of January 2007, 
there were already two million refugees in Iraq, with between 
an additional 50,000 to 100,000 people being driven from their 
homes each month.  In an unfortunate cycle of mutual reinforce-
ment, massive displacement has contributed to further sectarian 
segregation, as a large portion of the internally displaced are moved 
into homogenous communities. Now less than 10 percent of Iraqi 
political parties represent more than one ethno-sectarian group 
(O’Hanlon 6).
Aside from overt violence, current studies indicate that ethnic 
discrepancies have permeated the political system as well.  Many 
Sunnis report that they are not receiving the same services allowed 
to Shiite and Kurds.  In one poll, 56 percent of Sunnis said that 
they had been subjected to police violence, while only 7 percent of 
Shiites reported similar experiences.  Thus, as would be expected, 
government approval ratings are thus closely correlated with ethnic 
affiliation, with 85 percent of Sunnis reporting a dislike of Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite (7).
Given these developments, policy-makers are under pres-
sure to devise a strategy that targets ethnic violence in order to (1) 
prevent genocide and (2) facilitate respect for the national govern-
ment. The emergence of soft partition as a viable option stems from 
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the underlying belief that, while “local governments may have less 
expertise…they have much higher standing with their own people” 
(O’Hanlon 27).  Regional control would be preferable to the cur-
rent federal system that is marked by a “lack of dependability and 
lack of independence from the ethno-sectarian conflicts” (27).  The 
federal government of Iraq would not be abolished but would have 
significantly less power than in an integrationist system of national 
unity. 
Though proponents of soft partition qualify their plan with 
the claim that it would not necessitate an ethnic division, the way 
in which they have devised the plan does, in fact, rely upon a sep-
aration of Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.  Utilizing the Tigris River 
as a marker, O’Hanlon assumes that the area north of Baghdad 
would be designated a Sunni region, while the area south of Bagh-
dad would be explicitly Shiite.  Dawn Brancati, in her article “Can 
Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” more directly advocates an ethnic break 
up, calling for “division of regional borders along, not across ethnic/
religious lines” (Brancati 17).  Consistent with traditional partition 
theory, the use of ethnicity as a determining factor in the creation 
of new borders is considered to be a means of decreasing the fre-
quency of interaction between ethnic groups and, consequently, 
decreasing opportunities for violence.
This is not to say that proponents of soft partition discount 
the possibility that it could exacerbate ethnic violence.  Nearly all 
who have written in support of the policy acknowledge that the 
success of partition would require cautious planning and sensitive 
execution on the part of both Iraqi leaders and American policy-
makers. Chaim Kaufman, for instance, admits that “even when 
carried out safely, population transfers inflict enormous suffering” 
(Kaufmann 121).  Still, he makes the case that “the international 
community should stop trying to prevent the movement of refugees 
away from threats of ethnic massacres and should instead support 
and safeguard their resettlement” (156).  In a sense, proponents 
of partition suggest that the implementation of a formal partition 
policy will help to control for certain risk factors in a process that 
would occur anyway.
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when is soft Partition liKely to suCCeeD?
Wholesale support for partition
Research such as Horowitz’s shows that if partition is not 
agreed upon by all parties involved, it is far more likely to lead to 
“secessionist warfare” that would “reduce prospects for… post-parti-
tion harmony” (Horowitz 590).  Even O’Hanlon concedes that an 
important factor for success is the willing participation of the Iraqi 
population. Commenting on the large-scale movements of people 
that would be involved in partition, he notes: “the key is to have 
the parties in Iraq accept the relocation policy at least informally” 
(O’Hanlon et al, 18).  However, according to poll data, it seems this 
necessary condition would not likely be attained. 
Despite the serious consideration of partition as a potential 
solution to ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq, the policy has gar-
nered criticism from certain key parties involved in the region. Op-
ponents of partition include Iraqi officials in the Maliki govern-
ment, the Bush Administration, the Iraq Study Group, and “deeply 
splintered” Sunni Arabs who fear that, as the minority group, their 
rights would be endangered (1-2).  Among the Shiite population, 
a 2006 poll indicated that 59 percent advocate the division of Iraq 
into separate states. O’Hanlon cites this statistic as a signal that 
Iraq is ready to move forward with the policy.  However, one could 
also interpret this figure as an indication that a large number of 
Shiite are still opposed to partition.  Since it is in the interest of 
each of these groups to find a solution to the quagmire in Iraq, it 
is all the more ominous that there has been such a reluctant and 
ambivalent response to proposals for partition.
Ethnic Homogeneity in Each Region 
Despite clear antagonisms, the country is still characterized 
by a complex interaction of ethnic groups that would prevent com-
plete homogenization.  As O’Hanlon acknowledges, “the country 
is still too mixed demographically, with up to a third of marriages 
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across ethno-sectarian lines, and too unified culturally between its 
Sunni and Shiite Arabs” to allow for ethnic isolation (O’Hanlon 1). 
Brancati, advocating a policy of ethnic federalism agrees that “creat-
ing completely homogenous regions in Iraq is impossible because 
Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups are intermixed in some 
areas of the country” (Brancati 17).  Thus, even among proponents 
of partition, complete homogeneity is not considered feasible.
This is problematic for two reasons.  First, according to the 
parameters set forth by Horowitz, ethnic heterogeneity decreases 
the likelihood that partition would mitigate violence.  While pro-
ponents of partition may contend that ethnic isolation would not 
be legally required, Brancati and O’Hanlon both suggest using 
identity cards as a tool to help monitor population movements and 
regional demographics.  This administrative task would prove con-
troversial and complex for many including, for example, the chil-
dren of one third of Iraqi marriages.
Ethnic heterogeneity also presents an obstacle to the imple-
mentation of partition, first, in regards to subgroup classifications 
that exist apart from the Sunni-Shiite divide. According to Horow-
itz, in the course of separating a population into two or three over-
arching categories, “subgroup cleavages will assume heightened im-
portance” (Horowitz, 590).  In Iraq, this could present itself among 
minority groups such as Turkomen and Assyro Chaldian Chris-
tians (O’Hanlon et al 16).
Second, the imposition of policies intended to encourage eth-
nic polarization is more dangerous when a population is ethnically 
heterogeneous. Even if ethnic groups could somehow be isolated—
which, as discussed above, is unlikely—the necessary relocations 
could easily be manipulated in order to oppress minority groups. 
For instance, according to sociologist Daniel Elazar, society elites 
tend to support heterogeneity in general but impose homogeneity 
in groups that they control in order to “oust elements that they per-
ceive as alien… and to achieve ideological, religious, or ethnic ‘pu-
rity’” (Stanovcic 367).  O’Hanlon addresses the issue by suggesting 
that “coalition forces and Iraqi security units should plan for popu-
lation movements that are fraught with danger” (17).  However, 
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this would place significant pressure on a presumably newly created 
security force that is dealing with new political conditions.
External Foreign Support
Horowitz is ambivalent in the case of the third precondition 
he cites as conducive to the success of partition.  Although he as-
serts that “virtually all of the strong post-war secessionist move-
ments have been supported by powerful international connections,” 
he also acknowledges that such support can provoke “the central 
government to secure its own, overwhelming outside aid” (272, 
277).  In the case of Iraq, there exist many interest groups that, 
even if they consent to partition, will likely disagree on the specific 
terms of implementation. 
Conflict between Iraqi groups regarding the specific condi-
tions of various partition proposals would complicate the issue of 
foreign assistance. While the US might pledge its support for parti-
tion, it could not simultaneously support various conflicting plans 
for implementation. The Maliki government, for instance could 
garner the support of the United States to implement one parti-
tion plan, while other interests, such as radical groups, could align 
with other foreign powers in favor of another partition plan. Given 
the discrepancy between the national interests of various groups in 
Iraq—ethnic or otherwise—external foreign support for partition 
would, at the very least, be a source of complication rather than 
encouragement. 
  
statistiCal analysis of Partition
In his empirical critique of Partition Theory, Nicholas Sam-
banis uses a dataset that includes all civil wars after 1944 to es-
timate the impact of ethnic partitions on the probability of war’s 
recurrence, on low-grade ethnic violence, and on the political insti-
tutions of successor states.  In his initial analysis, Sambanis finds 
that the implementation of partition is correlated with a decrease 
in low-level violence.  However, when he subjects the variable to 
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more rigorous models he finds conflicting results, indicating that 
“the partition variable is extremely fragile to different specifications 
of the model, in contrast to most of the other explanatory variables 
(such as human cost, war duration, war outcome, and the type of 
UN peace operations)” (Sambanis 23).  Furthermore, he finds that 
the “positive impact of partitions on reducing low-grade violence is 
conditional on the involvement of a major power, on the patterns 
of third-party partial intervention in the war, on the type of war 
outcome, on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity… and on the size 
of refugee movements in the war” (16).  From these results, he con-
cludes that, on average, partition does not significantly reduce the 
possibility for new violence after its implementation.
For the purpose of examining the likelihood that partition 
would mitigate ethnic violence in Iraq, specifically, I will examine 
Sambanis’s dataset in relation to current data from the region.  I 
will narrow Sambanis’s dataset to include only cases of ethnic civil 
war, to see if his findings still hold. 
While the sample size for my examination of ethnic wars is 
limited, the results of my logistical and stepwise regressions, com-
bined with the results of Sambanis’ examination of a larger sample, 
indicate that there is no significant statistical-historical evidence to 
indicate that partition is correlated with decreased violence in cases 
of ethnic civil war. 
Data Collection:
The dependent variable in this equation is NOVIOL2.  It is 
a dummy variable signifying the likelihood that there will be no 
violence two years after the implementation of partition. Below are 
listed the independent variables that I use in my regressions, and 
that I evaluate according to current conditions in Iraq.
BORDER: Variable denoting the number of land borders  
6 (CIA World Factbook)
COST: Total number of deaths/displacements  
3,124,180 as of January 2007 (Cordesman, CSIS Report) 
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To remain consistent with Sambanis, I will use the variable 
LogCost, rather than the direct cost value.
DEAD: Total number of Deaths
 60,098 (Cordesman, CSIS Report) 
 I used the high number from a window given in January 
2007, on the assumption that current deaths would be 
closer to the high estimate by this point.  Again, for the 
sake of consistency in comparing my data-set with that of 
Sambanis, I will utilize the variable LogDead.
EH: Ethnic Heterogeneity index:
 As discussed in the section above, this variable is one of 
the most important to consider because, as Horowitz and others 
have shown, the degree of heterogeneity at the sub-national level 
seems to be inversely related to the success of partition. However, 
for this study, it is impossible to determine ethnic heterogeneity 
at the sub-national level (that is, within the proposed partitioned 
states) for two primary reasons. First, because the Biden proposal 
does not yet delineate the borders of the proposed partition, we are 
unable to confine our analysis to the appropriate sections of the 
population. Second, accurate data collection of a defined region is 
nearly impossible due to the rapid movement of people amidst the 
violence, and the large number of internally displaced people.
As an alternative, I will measure the Ethnic Heterogeneity 
at the national level, using an index developed by Tatu Vanhanen, 
which was also used by Sambanis in his calculations.  The index 
ranges from 0-144 and takes into account racial, linguistic, and re-
ligious heterogeneity via the formula below. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that this calculation vastly under-
estimates the level of heterogeneity in Iraq because it does not al-
low for a consideration of tribal groups within these larger ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious categories.  For example, while Iraq is 60 
percent Shiite and 75 percent Arab, there are many tribes within 
these broad classifications that would not consider themselves po-
litically or culturally aligned.  I have decided to include the calcula-
tion because it allows for at least a low estimate of the average het-
erogeneity, but the reader should keep in mind that the results of 
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the analysis would be even more discouraging if I could accurately 
gauge just how intermixed the country really is.
%largest racial group + %largest linguistic/national/tribal group + 
% largest religious group= Ethnic Homogeneity
Iraq: 75% Arab + 75% Arabic-speaking + 60% Shiite (CIA World 
Factbook)
Sum of the inverse percentages= Ethnic Heterogeneity
Ethnic Heterogeneity in Iraq =  25+40+25 = 90
GARM: Size of the government military
 350,000 (globalsecurity.com)
GDPCAP: Real income per capita, PPP-adjusted
 $1900 (CIA)
INTERVEN: Was there third party intervention?
 Binary- YES (code 1)
LOGCOST: Natural Log of Deaths/Displacements
 14.9547
LOGDEAD: Natural Log of Deaths
 11.0037
MAJOR: Was there a major power involved?   
Binary- YES (code 1)
MILOUT: Did the war end in military victory?   
Binary- NO (code 0)- since the war has not conclusively 
finished.
PART: Was there partition?     
Binary: YES (code 1)- because we are predicting the effect 
of partition on ethnic conflict.
RIDP: The number of people displaced both internally and exter-
nally due to the war
 3,064,082 as of January 2007 (UNHCR via CSIS)
UNOPS: Number of UN peace operations   
There have been no official UN peace operations in Iraq.
WARDUR: The number of months that the war has gone on.
 56 as of January 2007 (CSIS)
WARTYPE: Is the war considered an ethnic conflict?
 Binary- YES (code 1)
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Research Design: Part 1
For the first component of my research, I replicate Sambanis’s 
table, but include only wars that involved some aspect of ethnic 
conflict (see Figure 1).  Here I would like to point out that, while 
Sambanis uses a probit regression model, I employ a logistic model. 
Both models yield essentially the same results, however the logistic 
model does not assume normality in the probability distribution of 
the variable NONVIOL2.  Because my sample size is smaller than 
that used for all ethnic wars, I did not want to assume normality, 
and thus, the logistic model is more appropriate.  
My regression, confined to ethnic conflicts, supports the con-
clusion reached by Sambanis in his examination of all civil wars. 
Sambanis’ Model 1 indicated that partition was not significantly 
correlated with a decrease in low-level violence.
  Figure 1- Model 1: Ethnic Wars
Research Design: Part II
As a second component of my research, I wanted to include 
additional variables in my regression, to see if further specifying the 
conditions to replicate those in Iraq might yield different results 
(see Figure 2).  I expected that, given the data for these variables, 
the result would indicate that partition would be even less likely 
to succeed than when it was examined in relation to the variables 
157Journal of Politics & Society
listed in Model 1.  
On the contrary, Model 2 produces an odds ratio value of 
3.79 for partition, indicating that, given this additional data, parti-
tion would be even more likely to succeed.
  Figure 2- Model 2: Ethnic Wars
To understand this outcome, we can refer to Sambanis’s origi-
nal examination, which also indicated that partition was significant-
ly correlated with a decrease in violence.  He eventually determined 
that his original model was not robust due to “overspecification.” 
This occurs when multiple interacting variables contaminate the 
regression, producing significant p-values for variable coefficients 
that would not be significant if examined individually.  To see if my 
results were contaminated by overspecification, I performed a step-
wise function and found that, in fact, they were.  Upon the stepwise 
variable selection, partition dropped out as a significant factor, af-
firming the results obtained in Model 1.
Research Design: Part III
Some might contend that, since the examination did not reveal 
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any significant figures, the lack of correlation between partition and 
no violence is not necessarily indicative of the relationship of the 
factors, but rather of the weakness of the model itself.  Therefore, 
as a final component of my research, I compare the cases of ethnic 
war in which partition as been implemented.  Of 80 countries in-
cluded in the sample, 18 have been the subjects of some version of 
a partition policy. Of the 18 cases of partition, nine experienced a 
decrease in violence and nine did not. While approximately two-
thirds of non-partitioned countries experienced violence and only 
one-third did not, the Chi-squared test below indicates that there 
is no significant relationship between partition and no violence.
Figure 3- Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction
X-squared = 0.5048, df = 1, p-value = 0.4774
Due to the unquantifiable nature of many of the variables in-
volved, this estimate is by no means conclusive. However, given the 
risks associated with the implementation of a partition policy, there 
is not significant evidence to suggest that it will be successful. To 
the extent that we can measure the costs and benefits of partition, 
the results are not encouraging.
ConClusion
As the French mathematician, physicist and philosopher, 
Blaise Pascal once said: “diversity without unity means anarchy, and 
unity without diversity means tyranny” (Stanovcic, 365).  This real-
ity, regarding the complexity of creating constitutional and elector-
al systems, is too often overlooked in the idealistic desire of stable 
nation states to facilitate the stabilization of other nation-states. 
However, as historical analyses have demonstrated, the imposition 
of government systems is a risky business that often causes more 
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problems than it solves.
Accepting the complexity of nation building does not neces-
sitate the abandonment of Iraq, or any other country in need of 
international support.  However, the imposition of electoral sys-
tems implies an understanding of local cultural specificities that are 
impossible for a third party to obtain, particularly given the fluid 
and transient nature of ethnic affiliations. As a result, third parties 
often serve better as supporters rather than formulators of policy.
In this paper, I have argued that the imposition of a partition 
plan in Iraq would not be an appropriate course of action.  First, I 
have suggested that ethnic conflicts have often been misinterpreted 
by third party policymakers.  As a result, such intervention has 
sometimes exacerbated ethnic violence.  In examining the misun-
derstanding that British occupants displayed during the coloniza-
tion of Iraq, one can see the way in which inappropriate ethnic poli-
cies can legalize and codify once-vague group distinctions.
Second, a historical overview of partition has indicated that 
its success tends to rely upon specific conditions on the ground, 
including (1) a wholesale defection of forces formerly committed to 
a unified government and (2) the homogeneity of each new region. 
As I have demonstrated, these factors are not present in Iraq.
Finally, a statistical analysis of the likelihood that partition 
would mitigate ethnic violence has weakened the argument of par-
tition’s advocates, who carry the burden of proof.
There exist several alternative solutions such as integrationist, 
consociationalist, and federalist models.  Each policy would entail 
its own set of risks, and none presents itself as an ideal answer to 
Iraq’s complex dilemma. My point, however, is that such questions 
are not to be decided by an outside party.  The United States should 
provide support to Iraqis in whatever system they choose, especial-
ly in the realm of security, but American policymakers do not have 
the nuanced understanding of local culture that is required for this 
process.
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